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Abstract: This article aims to detect the dynamic effect of M & A of European banks on productivity 
during the period from 2005 to 2013. The estimation of our model by the GMM method allowed us to 
detect the following results. First, in the long term, the European banking structure seems to be 
submitted to the convergence phenomenon which means that the banking industry will probably 
governed by monopolistic structures which will share the market equally or nearly equal. Second, the 
production factors (labour and capital), had positive and significant effects on the banking product. 
However, the returns to scale are found to be decreasing as long as the sum of the labour coefficient 
(0.317) of fixed assets (0,132) and liquid assets (0.351) is less than unity.  Third, the time had exerted 
a negative and significant effect on production which questions the validity of the chosen period 
characterized by the advent of the subprime crisis. Fourthly, the M & A had a significant positive 
instantaneous effect on production of banks which allows us to affirm that in a pessimistic 
environment; it seems that the M & A strategies can be effective solutions to overcome the crisis. 
Fifth, the dynamic effects of M & A are positive and significant on production which means that the 
advantage of said M & A appears better in the long term as long as in this time horizon the merged 
banks are more able to realize their mergers reducing the cost of restructuring and to release more than 
returns to scale. 
Keywords: M&A, productivity, dynamic effects, GMM 
JEL classification: G15, G21, G24 
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1. Introduction  
From the 90s, the world has experienced a wave without previous of (M&A) in both the US and 
Europe.  And despite that the phenomenon is not new, its scale and the forms it takes appear highly 
important. Indeed, financial globalization and increased competition have encouraged the rise of large 
number of (M&A) and have set the Europe in the heart of concentration movements. The importance 
of these (M&A) is mainly due to the fact that they are no longer restricted to little firms or limited to 
one sector. Indeed, in this decade (of the 90s) we have noted an increase in "mega mergers" especially 
in its second half as indicates by the report of groups of ten (2001) showing that among the 246 mega-
mergers that took place in 1990-1999, more than 80% of them were held between 1995 and 1999. 
Also, it would be important to reveal that this movement of M&A have implied other sectors (in 
addition to industrial sector) because it spread throughout the economy and particularly the banking 
sector. As illustration, the work of Amel et al (2004) showed that the most of (M & A) were held in 
financial services between 1990 and 2001 and affected especially the banks which represented nearly 
53% of all (M & A) in the financial sector, which represent worth 1835 billion of dollars. 
The majority of researchers have focused on the static effects of M&A on performance but, they have 
not given importance to the productivity aspects. Also, the scarce works which have tried to study the 
effects of M&A on productivity have not developed the dynamic aspects allowing them to see what 
will be the said effect in the long run.  
Thus, in the present paper we will try to overcome these deficiencies by trying to answer to the 
following question: what are the dynamic effects of the M&A on the factor productivity? So to 
respond to this problematic we will see in the second section, the literature review explaining the main 
mechanisms through which the M&A can transmit the productivity effects. The third section presents 
the model and the data.  The fourth one will be reserved to interpret the principal results of 
econometric estimation.  The fifth and last section will conclude the paper. 
2. The transmission mechanisms of the M&A strategies on production and 
productivity  
No doubt that M&A generate a qualitative and quantitative change in the merged 
entities. This, is mainly explained by the fact that said M&A change, the capital and 
the labour structures within the merged entities 
Therefore, it would be simple to note that, in both cases of merger and / or of 
acquisition, there will be born a new entity that will be a new independent economic 
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structure. Thus, it will be important to know the nature of its returns to scale. Also, 
what is the impact (immediate effect) and possible dynamic effects of the increase in 
capital and labour (resulting from the M&A) of the new entity on its factor 
productivities?  
All things being equal, the positive effects of M&A on productivity can be resulting 
from a plurality of mechanisms and objectives which can be realized immediately after 
the firm’s integration. These goals are the value maximization, profit increase, 
economies of scale, reduction of costs and risks, increase of the productivity of 
production factors. 
2.1 The theoretical effects of M & A on maximizing the financial value 
Many studies have converged to the fact that M&A contribute to maximizing the 
financial value of the merged banks. In this line of conduct Berger et al (1999); Group 
of Ten (2001) and Pilloff and Santomero (1998) have showed that maximizing the 
company's value is the primary objective for which banks resort to M & A. Also, 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) have showed that the M & A create value and that the 
shareholders of target companies are the main winners. The study of Beitel and 
Schiereck (2001) on European banks has showed that M & A create value both for 
shareholders of target banks than those of acquiring banks.  
Nevertheless, Malatesta Paul H, (2003) concludes that it exist a significant negative 
impact on the long term in terms of market profitability for buyers. This negative impact is 
recorded in the long term, also in target companies but it was not statistically significant. 
According to Travlos, Nickolaos, (1987)1, the results of banks post-M&A depend on 
the manner of their settlement. Indeed, acquisitions settled in cash lead to positive rates 
of return, while those paid in shares recorded falls that time their announcement date. 
The study of Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Gershon N. Mandelker (1992)2, shows a statistically 
significant loss of nearly 10% amongst the buyer over a period of five years after the 
operation, which according to the authors is not due to a size effect.  
                                                          
1 Nickolaos G. Travlos (Sep., 1987) Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock 
Returns The Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 943-963 
2 Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Gershon N. Mandelker (Sep., 1992), ThePost-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re- 
Examination of an Anomaly Anup Agrawal, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 4 pp. 1605-1621 
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However, other studies have diverged relatively to the main results of the first package 
of literature review linked to the positive effects of M&A on the maximization of the 
banks value. Indeed, the 80s US studies, have shown that bank mergers and 
acquisitions had the effect of decreasing the value of new entities. The same studies 
have shown the existence of asymmetric effects exerted by the M&A on the different 
implied actors. Thus, the M&A have had negative effect for the purchaser, a positive 
effect for the target and a neutral effect for new entity. However, Zhang (1995)3 ; 
Becher (2000)4 have shown that effect can be positive for the different actors.  
Theoretically the said maximization may result from the increase of the market 
capitalization, of the new entity which will occurred when the merger or acquisition 
will take place via the stock market. Also, it is plausible to assume that the 
expectations of shareholders of the new entity will be probably optimistic for a 
possible improvement of its financial results. So this can lead to two main effects: first, 
to ensure the stabilization of financial equilibriums of the new entity (in the short run); 
second to maximize the financial value in the post-M & A period (in the long run). 
Also, all other things being equal, in such optimistic environment, the factors of 
production become more productive. This can be explained by the fact that once the 
financial value is maximized, thus, more investment spending will be engaged 
allowing the increase of marginal productivity of labour and capital. 
2.2 The theoretical effects of M&A on profit 
There is a near unanimity on the existence of a positive effect exerted by M&A on 
maximizing private benefits (Berger et al 1999; Group of Ten, 2001). The relationship 
established between the M&A and the profit is mainly due to the fact that they 
generate some immediate and instantaneous positive effects, on the new entity market 
share. 
Therefore, the merged entities operating on the same market will benefit of an increase 
of their market share what will result by an increasing their turnover and, all things 
being equal, of an increase of their profit. Also, other transmission mechanisms are 
possible. 
                                                          
3 Zhang, H. 1995. «Wealth effects from US bank takeovers». Applied Finaneial Economies 5, p. 329-336. 
4 Becher, D. A. (2000), “The valuation effects of bank mergers”, Journal of Corporate Finance, n° 6. 
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This is due to the possibility offered to the merged entity to dominate and exercise the 
leadership in the monetary market which allows them to exercise some control 
threshold, as an increase of interest rate, applied to credits and the control of a large 
amount of deposits (Berger et al. 1999). Hugues et al. (1999)5 have showed that M & 
A have been accompanied by an increase in banks performance, especially for bank 
mergers located abroad and which benefit for additional profits generated by the 
geographical differentiation. 
 However these benefits are not always symmetrical. In this line of conduct Cybo-
Ottone et Murgia (2000)6  have concluded that abnormal returns have a negative effect 
for the buyer and a positive effect for the target company. The same result where be 
confirmed by the study of Tourani-Rad et Van Beek (1999)7. The authors have noted 
too that there is an asymmetry among the stockholders of the different banks subject to 
M&A as long as the stockholders of target banks earn more in terms of positive 
abnormal returns than the stockholders of the acquiring banks. 
 Lepetit et al. (2004)8 have concluded that the M&A have significant positive effects 
on the profit of merged banks (the target and acquiring banks). The same result had 
been reproduced by Diaz et al. (2004)9 showing that acquisition can improve the profit 
of European merged banks.  
2.3 The theoretical effects of M&A on the return of scales  
Among the effects the most sought after M&A we can mention, without too much risk, 
the search for economies of scale. This goal can lead to decrease the average cost and 
to expand the market share, of the new entities. The empirical studues converge to this 
idea as shown by Cavallo and Rossi (2001) and Vander V (1994) which have 
                                                          
5 Hughes, J.P., Lang W.L., Mester, L.J., (1999): The dollars and sense of bank consolidation, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 23, pp. 291-324 
6 Cybo-Ottone, A. and M. Murgia, 2000, “Mergers and shareholder wealth in European banking”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 24, 831 – 859. 
7 Tourani-Rad, A. and Van Beek, L. (1999), “Market valuation of European bank mergers”, European 
Management Journal, 17 (5), pp. 532 - 540. 
8 Lepetit, L., S. Patry and P. Rous, 2004, “Diversification versus specialization: an event study of M&As in the 
European banking industry”, Applied Financial Economics 14, no. 9, 663-669. 
9 Diaz, B. D., M.G. Olalla and S.S. Azofra, 2004, “Bank acquisitions and performance: evidence from a panel of 
European credit entities”, Journal of Economics and Business 56, no. 5, 377-404 
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concluded the existence of economies of scale in the banking sector resulting from 
M&A.  
However, the works of Berger & Mester (1997), Allen & Rai (1996) and Altunbas & 
Molyneaux (1996), covering US banks (Berger and Mester) and an heterogeneous 
sample of countries including Europe, Southeast Asia and America, have not converge 
to such a reality. The same conclusion was detected by Barth et al (2000) showing that 
US banks during the M&A did not generate sufficient economies of scale, given the 
strong regulation in banking sector. 
2.4  The theoretical effects of M&A on risk minimization  
As long as the M&A can positively contribute to the increase in the merged banks size 
and possibly to maximize their values then it would be plausible to assert that the said 
M&A can reduce the risks to which banks may be exposed. Indeed, as far as the banks 
expand their sizes, so, they reduce the liquidity risk, bankruptcy and the lack of 
competitiveness etc. In this context, some authors have gone further by confirming, 
that the M&A can produce the adverse selection behaviour amongst managers. Indeed 
managers of banks having large sizes, and which they have not financial problems, at 
the moment of M&A, will be encouraged to be exposed to more risks (perform riskier 
projects). This rationality leads to increase systematically risks (Demsetz and Strahan, 
1997) and to expose more, to the risk of bankruptcy (Boyd and Graham, 1998). 
2.5 The theoretical effects of M&A on factor productivity 
It is worth noting that the studies which have focused on the effects of M&A on the 
factor productivity are scarce relatively to those having focused on their effects on the 
efficiency, the return on assets or on the scale economies of the new merged entities.  
In general rule, the majority of researches have claimed that the M&A are generating 
productivity gains. Such gain is due to various reasons: first, the size effect that can 
take place during the M&A; second, to technological gains that can positively 
influence the productivity of capital and labour; third to the new managerial strategies 
that can lead to better economic resource reallocation (X efficiency) 
Lichtenberg (1992) conclude that the M&A improve the business efficiency after a takeover. 
Indeed, the used methodology is to examine the evolution of the total factor productivity for 
seven years before and seven years after a takeover in the manufacturing sector. The results 
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had shown that before the takeover, the target companies have a productivity total factor 
significantly lower than that of the other companies. However, in the period post-M&A the 
gap diminishes significantly over time. After seven years of M&A and of the takeover, the 
difference between the productivity of acquired businesses and the non-acquired businesses is 
more significant. According to the author this productivity gain is due partially to the new 
managerial strategies aiming to restructure the new entities (decrease in total employment, 
new organisation of economic resources, etc.). 
 
Conyon et al (2002) have tried to study the impact of mergers of foreign companies on the 
productivity and wages of target companies over the period that spreads from 1989 to 1994. 
The authors concluded that such mergers generated a positive effect on wages of 3% and an 
increase in productivity of 13%. 
Haynes et Thompson (1998)10 have tried to have tried to present an empirical investigation of 
the impact of acquisition activity on financial intermediary productivity by using an 
augmented production function approach to investigate the impact of acquisition, after 
controls for input changes. The sample contains 93 UK building societies over the period, 
which spread from 1981 to 1993. The authors have concluded that it exists significant and 
substantial productivity gains following acquisition.  Also, they note that the post-merger 
gains appear to increase substantially in the post-deregulation period, when pressures to 
minimize cost are widely considered to have increased. 
Anthony N. Rezitis (2008)11 had tried to study the effect of acquisition activity on the 
efficiency and total factor productivity of Greek banks. The main results are relatively 
not conforming to theoretical assumptions. Indeed, the author had shown that the 
effects of mergers and acquisition on technical efficiency and total factor productivity 
growth of Greek banks are rather negative. He argues that the decrease in total factor 
productivity for merger banks is due to two main factors. First, the increase in 
technical inefficiency of merger banks decreased in the period after merging, and 
second to the disappearance of economies of scale. 
 
3.  Model and data 
                                                          
10 Haynes, M., & Thompson, S. (1999). The productivity effects of bank mergers: Evidence from the UK 
building societies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 23(5), 825-846. 
 
11 Rezitis, A. N. (2008). Efficiency and productivity effects of bank mergers: Evidence from the Greek banking 
industry. Economic Modelling, 25(2), 236-254. 
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The principal objective of our model is to respond to three fundamental questions.  
- First, what is the impact of time on productivity? The response to this question allows us to 
know if the time (T) M&A have a significant effect on bank productivity; this dimension was 
for long time omitted while its importance. Indeed, the integration of time as explanatory 
variable can allow us to determine the dynamic aspect of productivity. So, if the time will 
have positive effect on productivity we deduce that the factor productivity is linked to a vector 
of variables which is determined by time (experience, learning by doing, technology 
accumulation, historical returns to scale). 
- Second, what is the immediate effect of M&A on productivity? This leads to know if exists 
an instantaneous effect exerted by M&A on productivity. This effect is detected by the 
integration of dummy variable (MA) taking the value 0 before M&A and the value 1 after 
M&A 
- Third, what is the dynamic effect of M&A on productivity? This allows us to detect the 
nature of dynamic of M&A on productivity by the creation of a composite variable (TxMA) 
which take on account the interaction of the two dimensions of Time (T) and of the M&A 
(MA).   
It is worth noting that the methodology of our paper will follows formally the approaches of 
Murray and White’s (1980) and Haynes and Thompson (1998) to evaluate the bank 
production function. These approaches use a generalized Cobb-Douglas form with labour and 
capital inputs.  Thus, o capture the nature of relation between the bank output and the factor 
productivity we can therefore consider a Cobb-Douglas production function where labour and 
capital are the two main inputs12. The main advantage of this formulation is that it is relatively 
simple and leads to explicit and endogenize the theoretical relationship established between M 
& A and productivity of commercial banks. The output (Q) of the bank (i) at time (t) can be 
expressed as follows: 
Qit=ALit
α Kit
β
 eit
 γTime
       (1) 
 
Where L is the amount of labour, K is the stock of capital (we use two forms of capital: the first 
consider the value of fixed assets (K1). The second consider the value of liquid assets (K2)13), A is a 
parameter that reflects the state of technology and α and β are coefficients that indicate the 
importance of the effect of different factors on total production. T represents the time horizon 
                                                          
12D'autres spécifications telles que la fonction translog ne modifiez pas les conclusions présentées dans ce document. 
13 Toutes les variables monétaires sont exprimées en prix constants. 
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considered in our sample (which spread from 2005 to 2013). Assuming that one bank is 
submitted to M&A in 2007 thus in this year T is equal to zero. In the period pre-M&A the 
value of T should be negative (in 2005 T is equal to -2; in 2006, T is equal to -1 and in 2007 T 
is equal to zero). In the period post M&A the time T will take a positive values; for example 
in 2008, T take the value 1, in 2009 T take the value 2 etc. To estimate the model it would be 
important to linearize it, by recourse to the logarithmic form. 
ln (Qit)= ln (A) + αln (Lit) + βln (Kit) +  γTime  (2)  
 
Following the approach of Megginson et al (1994)14; B. Villalonga (2000)15, G. Charreaux et H. 
Alexandre (2004)16  and  F. Issaoui  (2010)17 and  to well capture the instantaneous and the 
dynamic effect of M&A we will introduce two other variables. The first is a dummy variable 
(MA) which takes the value (1) in and after the occurring of M&A and the value (0) 
otherwise. The second is a composite variable (TxMA) which take in consideration the two 
aspects of time and M&A. This composite variable takes the value 0 before the M&A and 
positive values in and after the Merger. For example assuming that a bank is merged in 2007 
so the value of the (TxMA) is equal to zero (T=0 and MA=1) ; in 2013 the value of (TxMA) 
is 7 (since T=7 and MA=1).   Thus the econometric model (2) can be rewrite as follows: 
logQit = cts + μlogQit−1 +  αloglit + βlogK1it + λlogK2it + γTIMEit + δMAit +
θ(TIMEit × MAit) + ηi + εit      (3) 
 μ, α  β, λ, γ, δ and θ represent the coefficients to estimate. i design the name of bank (i=1; 2; 
...;60), t represent the time (t = 2005, ... ,2013).  
 
3.1. Sample and variables 
The data, extracted from the balance sheets of banks, are provided by the Bankscope database. 
Such data are annual and cover 23 countries of the European Union. The total number of 
banks is 60 merged banks (see Appendix1). 
At this level of analysis, it would be important to note that our sample selection was not 
arbitrary but was based on three fundamental reasons. First, the choice of the euro area 
                                                          
14 Megginson, W. L., Nash, R. C., & Van Randenborgh, M. (1994). The financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms: An 
international empirical analysis. Journal of finance, 403-452. 
15 Villalonga, B. (2000). Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 42(1), 43-74. 
16 Alexandre, H., & Charreaux, G. (2004). L'efficacité des privatisations françaises (Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 791-821). Presses de Sciences Po 
(PFNSP). 
17 Issaoui, F. (2009). Les effets dynamiques de la privatisation sur l'efficacité des entreprises: application au cas tunisien. Revue Libanaise de 
Gestion et d'Économie, 2(2), 51-99. 
10 
  
reflects the relative frequency of the number of M & A in commercial banks. However, in 
other less developed countries these operations are hitherto timid. 
 
Second, although in other developed countries (outside of Europe) there were M & A 
transactions in the banking sector, they were carried out essentially before 2005. Therefore, to 
have homogeneous and cylindered panel data, we were obliged to omit them. 
 
Thirdly, in the euro area, banks are subject to a single regulatory and face monetary and 
macroeconomic policies identical. Therefore, the estimation results may not, under any 
circumstances, be allocated on institutional or regulatory variables resulting from structural 
differences in the legal or regulatory structures differentiated but they will be directly 
attributed to the variables of the model. 
 
3.2. Model Specifications 
In this paper we use the system GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Generally, this approach is 
submitted to two conditions. The first condition is the presence of the delayed variable as 
explain as explanatory variable. The second condition is the presence of instrumental 
variables in the model. The simple version of the model, without restricted exogenous 
variables (autoregressive model), this is as follows 
Yit = αYi(t−1) + ηi + ϑit ;  |α| < 1                            (4) 
 
E(ϑit) = E(ϑitϑis) = 0, pour tout t ≠ s : We assume the serial correlation but not necessarily 
independence over time. Under these assumptions the Y value is delayed by two or more lags 
and they are considered as validated instruments in the first equation difference.  
ΔYit = αΔYi(t−1) + εit                                           (5) 
Avec, εit = ϑit − ϑi(t−1) 
This model implies the test of the following linear restrictions:  
E[(Y̅it − αY̅i(t−1))Yi(t−j)] = 0 ;  (j = 2,… , (t − 1) ;  t = 3,… , T)       (6) 
To simplify we assume: Y̅it = Yit − Yi(t−1). In total we have m = (T − 2)(T − 1)/2  linear 
restrictions to calculate. 
 
Under these assumptions, the problem is how to get an optimal estimator α when N is infinite 
and T is fixed. According to Arellano & Bond (1991) this problem should be solved with the 
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GMM estimator in two stages of instrumental variables. The equation (5) can be written in the 
vector form as E(Zi
′ϑ̅i) = 0, with, 
ϑ̅i = [
ϑ̅i3
⋮
ϑ̅iT
]  et Zi =
[
 
 
 
 
Yi1 0 0  ⋯ 
0 Yi1 Yi2  ⋯    
0 0 0   ⋱ 
0   0        0   
0   0        0   
0  0        0   
⋮    ⋮     ⋮    ⋮ 
0   0    0  0  
  ⋮  ⋮          ⋮  
Yi1 ⋯ Yi(T−2)]
 
 
 
 
  
The matrix size= (T-2, m) 
 
The model presented below allows us to analyze the dynamic and static effect of M & A on 
the productivity of banks in the EU 
logQit = cts + μlogQit−1 +  αloglit + βlogK1it + λlogK2it + γTIMEit + δMAit +
θ(TIMEit × MAit) + ηi + εit                                                          (7) 
First, we check if the sample studied is exactly identical. In other words verify, if the sample 
it is homogeneous or heterogeneous. This test is a Fisher in which we accept the null 
hypothesis (homogeneity of the sample) when the calculated Fisher lower than the tabulated 
value at a threshold of 5% and a degree of freedom [(N -1) N (T-1) -k]. Then we test the 
presence of individual effects ηi without taking in account of delay of the variable to 
explainlogQit−1. This is a test of Hausman, Chi2 at k degree of freedom. The null hypothesis 
for this test is the presence of the random effect; it will be accepted when the calculated value 
of Chi2 is less than the tabulated value. Finally, after identifying the fixed effect (individual), 
we estimate the model using the method of GMM dynamic panel. 
 
Specification test of the model: {
H0: individuel Homogeneity
H1: individuel Heterogeneity
 
 
logQit = cts +  αloglit + βlogK1it + λlogK2it + γTIMEit + δMAit + θ(TIMEit × MAit) +
ηi + εit                                                                  (8) 
Fisher's test, as estimated by this model leads us to reject the null hypothesis (critical 
probability is strictly greater than 5%). So we should take into account the heterogeneity of 
behaviours (individual characteristics). The hausman test:  
{
H0: E(ηi\Xi) = 0
H1: E(ηi\Xi) ≠ 0
 
With,  Xi = {loglit, logK1it, logK2it, TIMEit, MAit, (TIMEit × MAit)} 
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Table 1: Hausman test 
 
Fe re 
lnl1 .386 .366 
lnk11 .102 .201 
lnk22 .480 .539 
Time .076 .056 
Ma -.133 -.124 
Tma -.055 -.055 
Khi2 16.55 
 P>Khi2 0.011 
  
According to the results of the Hausman test, the calculated value Khi2 is strictly greater to 
the tabulated value, at 5% threshold (P> Chi2 = 0.011). Therefore, we reject the null 
hypothesis meaning that we are in the presence of fixed effect. We specified a model that 
accounts for the presence of individual effect due to the heterogeneity of individuals. So the 
model to adopt is as follows: 
   
logQit = cts + μlogQit−1 +  αloglit + βlogK1it + λlogK2it + γTIMEit + δMAit + θTIMEit
× MAit + ηi + εit 
To eliminate the fixed effect, we propose a transformation of the model. The above  model 
will be transformed into first différences. 
logQit = cts + μlogQit−1 +  αloglit + βlogK1it + λlogK2it + γTIMEit + δMAit + θ(TIMEit
× MAit) + ηi + εit 
    
given that Prodit = logQit − logQit−1 
The transformed model will be: 
Prodit = cts + μlogQit−1 +  αloglit + βlogK1it + λlogK2it + γTIMEit + δMAit + θ (TIMEit
× MAit) + εit 
The model is estimated with GMM then we verify the hypothesis of the presence of auto-
correlation of order 2 (AR (2)). Thereafter, we will verify the Hansen test to check for 
correlation between instrumental variables and the error term. 
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4. Results 
 
Table : 2 GMM Dynamic Estimation 
Variables Version1 Version2 Version3 Version4 Version5 
Lnq(-1)                   -,697 
(0,000)*** 
-,6691 
(0,000)*** 
-,543 
(0,000)*** 
-,6973 
(0,000)*** 
-,6975 
(0,000)*** 
lnl    ,317 
(0,000)*** 
,4501 
(0,000)*** 
,3709 
(0,000)*** 
,3128 
(0,000)*** 
,3133 
(0,000)*** 
Lnk1   ,132 
(0,000)*** 
- ,2037 
(0,000)*** 
,1302 
(0,000)*** 
,1323 
(0,000)*** 
Lnk2     ,351 
(0,000)*** 
,3517 
(0,000)*** 
- ,3639 
(0,000)*** 
,3604 
(0,000)*** 
time   -,053 
(0,000)*** 
-,1461 
(0,000)*** 
-,0009 
(0,902) 
- -,0105 
(0,000)*** 
ma ,0951 
(0,008)** 
,3492 
(0,000)*** 
,0604 
(0,044)* 
-,0277 
(0,173) 
,0117 
(0,637) 
tma ,043 
(0,001)** 
,1346 
(0,000)*** 
-,001 
(0,801) 
-,0106 
(0,000)*** 
- 
const 3,486 3,993 6,149 
(0,000)*** 
3,421 
(0,000)*** 
3,406 
(0,000)*** 
Sargan      0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
AR (1)            0,152 0,163 0,140 0,144 0,148 
AR (2)            0,279 0,266 0,197 0,284 0,287 
N 478 479 479 479 478 
In the five versions we have used GMM of Blundell and Bond [1998]: Dynamic relation  
*, **, *** means that the parameters are significants at the levels of 10%, 5%, 1% 
- The Sargan test tests the instruments validity  (instrumental variables used in this model are: (time and 
tma). Indeed the instruments are valid if p-value (Pr > Chi2) is superior or equal to 0.05. 
- The tests AR (1) et AR (2) of Arellano et Bond (1991) verify the hypothesis of auto-correlation of residuals: 
since the referencial equation was transformed in first differences, the residuals obtained should be correlated in 
order 1 and 2. 
   
 
The review of estimation results allows us to highlight several important remarks so important 
which necessitate depth analysis: 
- The first result is the negativity and the significance of the coefficient associated to the 
lagged variable. Indeed, the coefficient of said variable (-0.697)18 is negative and significant at 
1%. This brings us back to say that in the long period, the European banks will be submitted 
to the convergence phenomenon. The latter might be the logical result of financial 
restructuring strategies that were implemented just after the 2007 financial crisis.   
- The effect of labour on total production (0,317) is positive and significant at 1%. This means 
that when employment increases by 1%, the total production of banks increases by 0.317%. 
                                                          
18 All interpretations are made in the base of the first version which takes into account the integrality of 
variables. In other versions we have tried to decrease the number of the explanotary variables and to see their 
effects on the coefficients and their significance. 
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-  The Fixed assets (K1) had exercised a positive and significant effect at the level of 1%. The 
estimated coefficient is equal to 0,132 meaning that when the fixed assets increase by 1% 
thus, the bank production will increase by 0,132%. However, the coefficient associated to the 
liquid assets (K2) is positive and significant at the level of 1%. That coefficient stood at 0.351 
(or almost three times the value of the coefficient associated to K1). This seems logical as 
long as banking activity is inherently based on liquid assets which are determinant of the 
profit level of banks. 
- The effect of time (-0.053) is negative and significant at the level of 1% which means that, 
as far as time progresses, thus the banking production decreases. A priori, such a result seems 
strange as long as the majority of previous studies have converged to the fact that time has a 
positive and significant effect on the firm’s performances (accumulation of experience, best 
organization, know-how etc.). However, without trying to force himself on results and their 
interpretations, we can focus on the nature of the time frame of our study that spans the period 
(2005-2013) and in which the financial system experienced one of its deepest crises. Such 
crises of subprime had exerted adverse effects on almost all of the banks leading them to 
bankruptcy and integral dissolutions. Thus, given the specificity of this period we can 
understand, at least in part, the negativity of the sign of the time that could have been changed 
if the chosen period were considered "normal." 
 
- The positive and significant effect at the level of 1% exerted by the M&A on banking 
production as proven by the coefficient associated with the dummy variable (M&A), which 
amounts to 0,0951 
- The positive and significant dynamic effect (at 1% level) exercised by the M&A in the long 
term. In fact, despite that individually, time had exerted a negative and significant effect on 
the banks productivity, and that the M&A exerts a positive effect thus we note that the total 
combined effect on productivity (from these two forces (time and M&A)) is positive. The 
coefficient of the variable (TxMA) is of the order of (0.043) which appears to be equal to the 
sum of the coefficient of the time variable (-0053) and that of the variable M&A (0.0951) 
which means that the M&A and banking integration, in general, create positive dynamic 
effects in the long term allowing banks to become more productive and efficient. 
Conclusion  
In conclusion we can say that our article has tried to detect the dynamic effect of M & A of 
European banks on productivity during the period from 2005 to 2013. The estimation of our 
model by the GMM method allowed us to detect the following results. First, in the long term, 
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the European banking structure seems to be submitted to the convergence phenomenon which 
means that the banking industry will probably governed by monopolistic structures which will 
share the market equally or nearly equal. Second, the production factors,  labour and capital, 
had positive and significant effects on the banking product. However, the returns to scale are 
found to be decreasing as long as the sum of the labour coefficient (0.317) of fixed assets 
(0,132) and liquid assets (0.351) is less than unity. 
 Third, the time had exerted a negative and significant effect on production which questions 
the validity of the chosen period characterized by the advent of the subprime crisis. Fourthly, 
the M & A had a significant positive effect on production Instant banks which allows us to 
affirm that in a pessimistic environment; it seems that the M & A strategies can be effective 
solutions to overcome the crisis. Fifth, the dynamic effects of M & A are positive and 
significant on production which means that the advantage of said M & A appears better in the 
long term as long as in this time horizon the merged banks are more able to realize their 
mergers reducing the cost of restructuring and to release more than returns to scale. 
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Appendix 1: repartition of the merged banks by country 
Country banks Time ma LNQ LNL LNK1 LNK2 
PORTUGAL Deutsche Bank (Portugal) SA 2011 21,140 6,019 15,969 21,023 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Unicredit Bank Czech Republic 
and Slovakia AS 2013 26,047 7,338 20,610 24,655 
Unicredit Bank Czech Republic 
and Slovakia AS 1999/2001/2007/2013 26,007 7,306 20,587 24,574 
IRELAND Ulster Bank Ireland Limited 2010 24,299 8,085 19,288 22,782 
LATVIA 
Jsc Latvian Development 
Financial Institution Altum 1997 19,883 6,396 15,638 18,430 
BELGUIM 
Record Bank SA/NV 1995/2005/2006 23,312 6,601 16,535 21,440 
ING Belgium SA/NV-ING 1975/2003/2006/2006 25,650 9,184 20,681 24,461 
HUNGARY 
Banco Popolare Hungary Bank 
Zrt 2013 23,919 4,814 19,351 23,018 
Calyon Bank Magyarorszag Zrt-
Calyon Bank Hungary 2007 17,558 5,939 14,103 17,908 
Erste Bank Hungary Nyrt 1996/2004 21,446 7,841 16,434 19,737 
GERMANY 
Mizuho Corporate Bank 
(Germany) AG 2009 19,323 5,002 13,197 19,307 
FINLAND Nordea Bank Finland Plc 2000/2001/2002 25,558 9,023 18,680 24,914 
ROMANIA 
Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Romania 
SA 2012 21,304 6,486 18,229 19,024 
Banca Comerciala Romana SA-
Romanian Commercial Bank SA 1999 24,527 8,734 21,161 23,213 
SWEEDEN Nordea Bank Sweden AB (publ) 1994/2002/2004 26,678 8,889 21,799 24,841 
SPAIN 
Banco de Credito Local de 
Espaana 1999/2009 22,903 5,678 17,053 20,136 
GREECE 
Emporiki Bank of Greece SA 2013 23,712 8,740 19,533 21,805 
Agricultural Bank of Greece 2012 23,879 9,254 20,170 22,015 
National Bank of Greece SA 1998/2002 25,108 10,347 21,387 23,301 
National Bank of Greece SA 2007 22,386 7,919 18,571 21,103 
FRANCE 
KBL Richelieu Banque PrivÃ©e 2008 17,378 4,471 14,275 17,453 
Banque Saradar France 2005 19,107 4,433 13,241 19,307 
Aareal Bank France S.A. 2010 19,684 4,083 11,667 17,860 
Banque Audi Saradar France SA 2005 19,617 4,146 14,165 19,550 
Credit Suisse (France) 1997 19,786 4,940 13,137 19,560 
Banca Intesa (France) SA 2003/2008 20,996 4,443 13,765 20,084 
UBS (France) SA 2003 20,562 5,876 14,777 19,632 
HSBC France 1917/2002/2008/2010 25,675 9,177 19,657 25,009 
UK 
Citibank International Plc 2000 23,215 8,292 18,570 23,167 
Clydesdale Bank Plc 2004 24,194 8,438 18,791 22,564 
Co-operative Bank Plc (The) 2009 24,356 8,690 18,801 22,616 
Alliance & Leicester Plc 2001/2011 24,708 8,865 19,179 22,713 
Santander UK Plc 1944/1996 26,102 9,588 20,507 24,993 
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National Westminster Bank Plc - 
NatWest 1968/1970 26,091 10,135 21,170 25,712 
Standard Chartered Bank 2008 26,391 11,074 22,087 25,590 
Bank of Scotland Plc 2001/2007/2010 26,832 10,983 22,018 25,713 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1969 27,642 11,587 23,040 26,103 
Santander UK Plc 1944/1996 26,125 9,672 20,565 24,763 
LUXEMBOURG 
Hauck & Aufhauser Banquiers 
Luxembourg SA 2013 18,073 3,965 14,311 18,090 
VP Bank (Luxembourg) SA 2001 19,223 4,192 14,384 20,864 
Banco Itau Europa Luxembourg 2009 18,814 3,522 14,171 19,770 
Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg SA 2009 20,614 4,726 14,550 20,075 
Banque Degroof Luxembourg 
SA 2006 21,062 5,821 17,476 21,044 
Credit Agricole Luxembourg S.A. 1997/1999/2005/2008 21,320 5,873 16,050 21,797 
Credit Suisse (Luxembourg) SA 2002 20,611 5,271 17,022 22,025 
JP Morgan Bank Luxembourg SA 1998 20,227 6,280 15,660 22,048 
Dresdner Bank Luxembourg SA 2010 21,697 5,922 16,891 22,674 
Landsbanki Luxembourg SA 2008 21,161 3,913 14,341 20,334 
Deutsche Bank Luxembourg SA 1999 23,341 5,836 15,248 24,742 
UBS (Luxembourg) SA 1996/1998/2002 21,875 6,154 17,100 23,173 
DekaBank Deutsche 
Girozentrale Luxembourg SA 2002 21,929 5,880 15,343 22,278 
ING Luxembourg 2003 22,495 6,775 16,739 22,542 
KBL European Private Bankers 
SA 2005 22,988 7,865 19,023 22,732 
UniCredit Luxembourg SA 1998 23,725 5,556 17,741 22,761 
Banque Internationale 
Luxembourg SA 2001/2002 23,896 8,000 19,295 23,140 
BNP Paribas Luxembourg 2001/2006/2007/2010 22,996 6,315 16,901 23,616 
Austria 
Arab Bank (Austria) AG 2006 18,060 5,183 12,734 18,561 
Valartis Bank (Austria) AG 2009 19,673 4,519 14,021 19,326 
Kommunalkredit Austria AG 2009 21,917 4,821 17,283 21,490 
UniCredit Bank Austria AG-Bank 
Austria 1997/2000/2002 25,654 10,751 21,067 24,181 
 
